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The creation of artificial moral systems requires us to make difficult choices about which 
of varying human value sets should be instantiated. The industry-standard approach is to 
seek and encode moral consensus. Here we argue, based on evidence from empirical 
psychology, that encoding current moral consensus risks reinforcing current norms, and 20 
thus inhibiting moral progress. However, so do efforts to encode progressive norms. 
Machine ethics is thus caught between a rock and a hard place. The problem is 
particularly acute when progress beyond prevailing moral norms is particularly urgent, as 
is currently the case due to the inadequacy of prevailing moral norms in the face of the 
climate and ecological crisis. 25 
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Machine morality 
It has been argued that the development of machines programmed to make moral 30 
decisions risks atrophying human moral reasoning capacities, as humans come to 
outsource responsibility for decisions in which moral values are at stake to the machines 
[1, 2]. In this article, we identify a further concern: that moral machines risk impeding 
moral progress. Though our argument is general, the concern is particularly acute in the 
context of the urgent need for such progress at the present moment, in which prevailing 35 
moral norms are inadequate to address the ongoing environmental crises of climate 
breakdown [3] and ecological collapse [4] and the major threat to human life they pose. 
We define a morality as a set of values, in light of which those holding the values regard 
some types of actions as good (to be striven after) and others as bad (to be avoided) [5]. 
Moral behaviour is defined as behaviour motivated by or designed to realise such values. 40 
We further define moral machines as those engaging in computational operations 
involving representations of values that are intended to reflect morality in order to yield 
moral behaviour, either on the part of the machines themselves or on the part of humans 
to whom the machines issue guidance. By these definitions, a fire alarm is not a moral 
machine, even though it tends to produce outcomes that humans approve of, because it 45 
involves no internal representations of value. By contrast, a self-driving vehicle that 
cannot avoid a collision but makes a decision on whether to collide with three adults or 
two children [6] is a moral machine because it must operate on values derived from 
human morality in order to make the decision. Although these definitions may be 
challenged in various ways, they are sufficient for our argument here. 50 
Encoding moral values in the machines we design is increasingly a necessity to the extent 
that these machines are built to complete complex tasks involving interactions with 
humans but without human supervision, as in the case of self-driving cars and other 
autonomous robots. Engineers are usually regarded as obliged to programme moral 
behaviour in such machines [2, 7-10]. But moral machines may also be designed for 55 
decision-support roles, where it is argued that morally salient decisions that are currently 
normally made by humans can be made better or more efficiently by artificial systems [2, 
8, 9, 11]. For example, longer prison sentences are thought to be appropriate in the case 
of criminals who are more likely to reoffend, but algorithms are (in some cases) better 
than human judges at predicting reoffending rates [12, 13]. In more private contexts, it 60 
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has been argued that artificial systems could assist humans in living up to moral 
standards by providing moral advice [14-18]. 
A key question facing engineers building moral machines is this: which morality should 
they program? Which moral values in particular should be reflected in the machines’ 
operations? Given the diversity of human moralities, the answer is not obvious. One 65 
approach is implied by the definition of machine ethics offered by the relevant 
international industrial body, according to which ethical machines are those whose 
behaviour is based on human moral values taken to be universal, such as human rights 
[2, 9]. This suggests that moral machine engineers are responding to the problem of 
diverse human moralities by attempting to identify universal values and encode these 70 
(though some more nuanced approaches have also been proposed [6, 19-22]). However, 
universal values may be harder to identify than it may seem. Even human rights are not 
uncontroversial [21, 23]. Similarly, the consensus on the importance of fairness, another 
value that is emphasised in many of the available sets of ethical guidelines for artificial 
intelligence, is stronger amongst demographics typical for engineers than for other 75 
humans [24]. Perhaps more importantly, even if minimal principles such as human rights 
were universally accepted, such principles are not sufficiently comprehensive or specific 
to guide all the decisions that machine ethicists want machines to be able to make [6]. No 
consensus account of human rights determines how a self-driving car should choose in a 
conflict between protecting the life of its passenger and protecting the life of a 80 
pedestrian, for example, or how an AI system advising on the distribution of scarce 
medical resources should weigh the lives of different people with different diseases. 
Faced with these challenges, as well as the distinct concern that the systems they build 
might not be trusted by humans, engineers have aimed to design machines that 
instantiate as much as possible the values of their primary users [9, 24, 25]. Indeed, 85 
research on human trust of artificial decisions indicates that reliability, defined as the 
consistent production of expected decisions, is key [26]. Such research has focused 
primarily on perception of competence to make non-moral judgments. But a small body 
of work on human responses to artificial systems that are explicitly presented as making 
moral decisions confirms that humans tend to prefer such systems when they make 90 
judgments in line with their own judgments and those of other humans [27-29]. Further, 
trust in a given system tends to increase over time when people experience judgments in 
alignment with their expectations [26]. Especially given current low levels of trust in 
complex automated systems [30], it is unsurprising that organisations hoping for market 
success embed values in their machines that they take to reflect those of users. 95 
Machine morality and moral progress 
Most moral machines designed to perform complex tasks or provide decision-making 
assistance to humans will, then, reflect answers to the key question that go beyond 
consensus-reflecting commitments to minimal moral values such as human rights. This 
obviously raises concerns about the legitimacy of any particular machine morality with 100 
respect to the people with whom a given machine will interact or whose lives will be 
affected by the decisions it informs. These concerns are heightened by recent studies 
suggesting that algorithms trained or programmed to replicate human decision-making 
may instantiate existing human biases, effectively reflecting the distinctive moral failings 
of a particular group as well as the values it professes [31, 32]. Job applicant screening 105 
algorithms have been shown to discriminate against women, for example, reflecting a 
sexism that is at odds with the professed values of those whose behaviour the algorithm 
was designed to replicate [33]. 
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However, our focus here is on the risk not that moral machines will perpetuate 
commonly occurring violations of prevailing moral norms, but that they will calcify those 110 
norms and the values they reflect, impeding the ordinary mechanisms of moral progress. 
If it were possible to restrict machine morality to minimal, universal values such as 
human rights, this might not seem a particularly grave concern (though we note, again, 
that human rights are not uncontroversial). But, as we argued above, no such restriction 
is realistic for the kinds of moral machines that are now being built. These machines 115 
reflect values that go beyond the minimal and universal. Even at the abstract level, there 
is reason to think that progress beyond these values may be desirable. If moral machines 
risk calcifying them, that should be cause for concern in itself. Moreover, as we will go 
on to argue, there is reason to think that progress beyond the values likely to be calcified 
by the moral machines being designed and built today is urgently needed. The cause for 120 
concern is correspondingly greater. 
Before we turn to the way in which moral machines risk impeding mechanisms of moral 
progress, we should explain what we mean by ‘moral progress’. We have said that it is a 
challenge for engineers to select any particular morality from among the diversity of 
human moralities, and we have argued that minimal moral values do not provide a 125 
sufficiently comprehensive basis for overcoming that challenge. It might be thought that 
we face more or less the same problem in identifying values on the basis of which to 
formulate a criterion of moral progress, on the basis of which to argue that moral 
machines risk impeding it. If we could overcome that problem by identifying the 
necessary values, then so, it would seem, could the engineers of moral machines. 130 
In response: we do not rest our argument on a complete set of values on the basis of 
which to formulate criteria of moral progress. If we could plausibly identify any such 
values, that would indeed appear to answer the key question and undercut the concern 
about value calcification. Instead, we suggest that the following minimal principle of 
moral progress is plausible enough to justify seriously the concerns we raise: 135 
Minimal Principle of Moral Progress 
Moral progress obtains if the values internal to a morality change in ways that 
alter participant behaviour in ways that substantially reduce the likelihood of 
catastrophic, large-scale suffering without a corresponding increase in human 
rights violations. 140 
The intuitive idea underlying the Minimal Principle is that all other things equal, a 
development in a set of values represents an improvement if the community whose 
behaviour it regulates is steered away from catastrophic outcomes such as nuclear war or 
severe environmental collapse. No doubt refinements could be made to the Minimal 
Principle that would improve the degree to which it captures this underlying idea, but we 145 
take it that the point is clear. Note that neither the Minimal Principle as we have 
formulated nor any principle likely to capture the underlying idea implies any determinate 
set of progressive values that might provide the basis for an answer to the key question 
facing moral machine engineers. In particular, the Minimal Principle does not imply act 
utilitarian values, understood as those favouring individual acts that tend to maximise 150 
aggregate utility or welfare and disfavouring individual acts that tend to do anything else 
[34], since such values do not provide clear protection against human rights violations 
[35, 36]. Note too that the Minimal Principle offers a sufficient condition of moral 
progress, not a necessary condition. We do not deny that there can be moral progress 
that the Minimal Principle does not provide grounds for classifying as such. 155 
Machine morality is likely to impede moral progress 
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We have argued that because people prefer machines whose behaviour chimes with their 
own preferences, then machines that make moral decisions will tend to be designed to 
reflect the dominant behavioural moral status quo. When machines reflect the status quo, 
then to demonstrate that they will impede moral progress, it is sufficient to demonstrate 160 
that people will sometimes be influenced by these machines when they might instead 
have been influenced by progressive human voices. (For the case that moral machines do 
not reflect the status quo, see the next section.) 
Individuals already frequently respond to moral choices by relying on external expertise 
such as religious authorities. In medical dilemmas, for example, even non-religious Jews 165 
sometimes ask rabbis to make decisions on their behalf in a manner that has been 
described as moral “outsourcing” [37, 38]. Similarly, automatic intelligent systems are 
valued by humans because they save us the effort and worry of making decisions for 
ourselves. People can easily come to heavily rely on complex automated systems, to the 
extent that their own motivation and ability to make relevant decisions is reduced [1, 2, 170 
39]. A well-known example of this is the phenomenon of transportation accidents due to 
over-reliance on auto-pilots [40]. When automatic systems consistently make decisions 
that appear correct, human motivation and ability to question the systems are reduced. 
It has been suggested that over-reliance on algorithmic systems in the context of 
migration (as used in Canada) already represents a form of moral outsourcing that is 175 
reinforcing existing norms about the values of different types of migrants [41, 42]. As the 
use of such systems becomes the norm, they have the potential to become the type of 
established cultural institution that places inertia on cultural evolution (as the sociologist 
Bourdieu discussed [43]). 
Legal scholars have discussed the way in which formalising social rules can result in the 180 
perpetuation of practices which later generations come to regard as suboptimal but are 
difficult to change because of inertia within the system. Deakin [44] gives examples of 
“frozen accidents” in English employment law, where laws once regarded as appropriate 
to govern the “master-servant” relationship are no longer optimal for governing the 
modern employer-employee relationship but are still in place. Deakin argues this is in 185 
part because of a tendency for new legal frameworks to rely on the older ones in ways 
that make older ones hard to change, and in part because of a tendency to rationalise to 
defend the status quo (a well-known and wide-spread psychological phenomenon [45]). 
Given the functional similarity between machine morality and cultural institutions such 
as the law – they are both systems intended to issue relatively objective, reliable, and 190 
definitive judgements as to appropriate behaviour – it is reasonable to assume machine 
morality could also lead to similar “frozen accidents” because of similar institutional and 
psychological processes. 
Perhaps the strongest motivation for becoming comfortable with moral outsourcing to 
machines is that it offers a further psychological defence against the aversive state of 195 
cognitive dissonance that is experienced when our actions are not congruent with our 
explicit values [46, 47]. Moral behaviour is an expression of a combination of implicit 
and explicit values. Implicit values are strongly internalised and influence behaviour 
without the necessity for conscious thought. Explicit values are those which we claim to 
abide by. Because talk is cheap, our explicit values tend to be more progressive [48]. 200 
Morally relevant behaviour is strongly influenced by implicitly held values, however [49-
51]. For example, treatment of outgroups is at least as strongly influenced by implicitly 
held attitudes as by explicit attitudes [52, for a large-scale meta-analysis see 53]. Reference 
to moral advice from machines, if is based on existing behavioural norms (or encoded 
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reflections of them such as laws), may therefore help us to justify behaviour that is not in 205 
line with our explicitly claimed values. Consultation with such moral machines has the 
potential to fulfil the same moral function as token moral efforts such as “ethical” 
consumption, which tends to make us feel good in a way which licenses negative 
behaviour even outweighing the token positive acts [54, 55]. 
The history of moral progress is the history of hard-fought struggles by those who 210 
succeed in persuading the majority to adopt an initially minority view [56-58]. These 
social movements successfully utilise a broad diversity of inter-human tactics, from 
reasoned persuasion to example-setting to emotive acts of self-sacrifice [59, 60]. To the 
extent that outsourcing morality to machines places some decision making outside the 
realms of these processes, rendering us less susceptible to influence from progressive 215 
human values, moral machines represent a risk to moral progress. 
Why encoding progressive values is a problematic solution 
It might be objected that moral machine engineers can, in recognition of the concerns we 
have just identified, simply programme the machines they build with more progressive 
values, and thereby address the concerns [14-18]. However, this is a problematic 220 
proposal. One reason for this is psychological and empirical; the other is political and 
philosophical. 
The political and philosophical reason is as follows. As we noted above in our discussion 
of the Minimal Principle of Moral Progress, no determinate set of progressive moral 
values is implied by that principle. By contrast, any particular choice of progressive moral 225 
values, even if a morality instantiating these would indeed constitute progress according 
to the Minimal Principle, faces problems of legitimacy. Efforts to reflect prevailing moral 
norms, even if any particular choice inevitably involves privileging some contemporary 
moralities over others, can at least claim a sort of democratic legitimacy in virtue of that 
effort. By contrast, an engineer’s choice of one from among the many possible sets of 230 
progressive moral values that would constitute progress according to the Minimal 
Principle must inevitably reflect that engineer’s particular outlook and reasoning, or at 
best the outlook and reasoning of the select group involved in making the choice. In 
brief, there is no comparably legitimate substitute for the mechanisms of human moral 
progress that such a choice would short-circuit. 235 
The psychological and empirical reason for thinking that the concerns we have raised 
cannot easily be addressed simply by programming machines with more progressive 
values is that machines programmed with such values risk being rejected by the humans 
with whom they interact. There are reasons to expect that humans will react negatively in 
interactions with such machines even if they agree with the idea in principle. The first has 240 
to do with the phenomenon of ‘do-gooder derogation’: individuals tend to react 
negatively to those who they perceive as promoting exemplary moral behaviour. Do-
gooder derogation is in large part motivated by the desire to maintain a positive self-
image in the face of potential moral criticism from others, which can be achieved by 
discounting the value of others and their opinions [61]. Circumstances tending to prompt 245 
do-gooder derogation include: (1) that the derogator specifically desires to act in a way 
that is contrary to moral advice [62, 63]; (2) that the derogator perceives the other as 
deliberately occupying a moral high ground [64]; and (3) that the derogator perceives the 
other as acting hypocritically [65]. We are unaware of any research which directly 
examines how these effects might apply in the case of decisions taken or advice given by 250 
moral machines. However, we note that machines designed to reflect progressive moral 
values may well be perceived as occupying the moral high ground by design, will offer 
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advice which humans are tempted not to follow, and may (as machines) not be subject to 
their own prescriptions. It is therefore reasonable to predict that machines offering moral 
advice based on values more advanced than those of their advisees are subject to serious 255 
risk of do-gooder derogation. 
The second reason to expect that humans will react negatively to machines programmed 
with progressive values is the phenomenon of ‘outgroup derogation’, the most relevant 
aspect of which involves individuals discounting the attitudes of others whom they 
perceive as having different social identities to themselves [66, 67]. Non-human agents 260 
are in some sense the ultimate outgroup, and indeed humans display strong negative 
responses towards non-human agents when these appear or behave in ways that are 
similar but not indistinguishable from human appearances and behaviours (the uncanny 
valley phenomenon [68]). Interaction with non-human systems that act in some ways 
similarly to humans (by offering moral advice) may therefore activate processes of 265 
outgroup derogation. Outgroup derogation can be so strong that it creates a boomerang 
effect, whereby exposure to an argument from a mistrusted outgroup (e.g. one’s political 
opponents) actually reinforces the subject’s contrasting opinion [69, 70]. This effect is 
mediated by a sense of being threatened by proponents of the opposing opinion [71]. In 
this context, it is worth recalling that half of US citizens fear artificial intelligence [30]. 270 
Humans may be prone to a particularly strong sense of injustice when their actions are 
judged by machines. One study demonstrated the curious result that when humans 
judged mistakes made by artificial agents, perceived injustice was a stronger predictor of 
mistrust of the system than was perceived harm [72]. Compare also the recent UK public 
protests in response to A-level school grades being generated by an algorithm (dubbed 275 
‘mutant’ by the Prime Minister in response [73]).  
Because machines are not human and are unlikely to have existences that humans can 
relate to in relevant contexts, they will be unable to engage in many of the methods of 
moral persuasion that, as we argued above, are a crucial mechanism of moral progress 
and may serve to mitigate against these kinds of backfiring reactions. Machines will be 280 
restricted to the least effective methods (such as offering sensible reasons for actions 
[74]). There is, therefore, little to suggest that morally progressive machines represent the 
solution to the concern we have raised about calcification of prevailing norms. 
One reason why the problem is acute: moral psychology, the environment, and 
the urgent need for moral progress 285 
To this point, we have raised our concern in relatively general terms. Moral machines 
may hinder the mechanisms of moral progress, and that generates the danger of 
progress-inhibiting value calcification. We have also argued that the politics and 
psychology of human reactions to artificial intelligence precludes any simple solution to 
this problem. 290 
This way of raising the concern may make the dangers we have identified seem abstract 
and remote. This impression is mistaken, however. We conclude by providing a concrete 
illustration of the problem that shows it to be an acute and urgent concern. 
An overwhelming body of evidence indicates that humanity is currently doing enormous 
damage to the Earth’s climate and biodiversity [3, 4]. If we do not alter our course, 295 
human activity is likely to bring about catastrophic increases in global mean surface 
temperatures and devastating losses of ecosystem services and species within centuries or 
even decades, implying, for example, serious impacts on global food supplies [75]. 
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Moreover, we are running out of time to make the necessary changes. In 2015, in 
recognition of some of these risks, governments around the world agreed to try to limit 300 
global mean surface temperature increases to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels. A 2018 
report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimated that for even a 50% 
chance of achieving that target, global carbon emissions must be cut by around half 
within the next ten years and to ‘net zero’ by 2050. Moreover, that figure assumes the 
availability soon of carbon capture and storage technologies that have yet to be shown to 305 
work at the necessary scale. As the IPCC claimed, this will require radical 
transformations in energy, industry, transport, building, agriculture, forestry, and land 
use. Meanwhile, as a result of our activities, the sixth mass extinction is already under way 
[76-78]. 
This parlous state indicates a clear need for moral progress, according to our minimalist 310 
definition. Further, there are reasons to think the environmental crisis might be especially 
subject to the risks we have associated with machine morality. Some properties of human 
psychology make it particularly challenging to grasp the full implications of the crisis and 
thus also the extent of change necessary [79]. For example, problems that are seen as 
distant in time and space [80, 81] and not caused by malign intent [79, 82] tend not to be 315 
perceived as moral concerns requiring urgent attention. Collective decision making 
currently reflects these psychological biases, and it is therefore particularly likely that 
machine morality will reflect the inadequate status quo. 
Many populations do now espouse high levels of environmental concern – for example 
most Europeans explicitly claim to place a very high value on caring for the environment, 320 
caring no less than they claim to care for other people [83]. However, the lack of action 
(in proportion to the crisis) indicates a disconnect between explicitly espoused values and 
more strongly internalised implicit values that drive behaviour [84-86]. In part because of 
this potentially disconcerting value-action gap, individuals are particularly prone to token 
environmental behaviours, whereby they feel that because they have done “something”, 325 
they feel they have done “enough” [54]. This frequently leads to actions that feel 
environmentally good having an overall negative effect because they license 
compensatory negative behaviour [55, 87]. This implies that consultation with machines 
said to be environmentally moral, but which in fact implement a status quo or 
insufficiently progressive morality, could be particularly counterproductive in reinforcing 330 
a false sense of moral adequacy. The prevalence of corporate greenwashing [88] already 
demonstrates how companies target consumers’ implicit-explicit value gap, with 
marketing targeting explicit environmental values but products themselves targeting 
better internalised desires for low-cost products with little consideration for the 
environment [89]. It seems reasonable to assume that some commercial moral machines 335 
might do the same. 
Outside the mainstream cultures of developed Western societies, environmentalist values 
are sometimes much more deeply embedded within cultural norms [90]. Studies in the 
field of cultural evolution illustrate that cultural change to reduce environmental impact 
is psychologically realistic: evolved cultural practices can maintain environmental impact 340 
at sustainable levels [91], and rapid moral evolution is in principle possible [92-94]. And 
environmentally progressive values might also be encoded in machines, of course. We 
note, however, that because the environment is an area where progressive values are 
already often espoused, it is well known that there are strong psychological defence 
mechanisms that operate to ignore or derogate such values when they require sacrificial 345 
action, even in cases where the individual themselves espouses the values [46, 47, 95]. 
Only a limited set of progressive message types can bypass these defence mechanisms to 
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induce moral progress through properly internalised values – for example, role-modelling 
by prominent ingroup members at a grass-roots level [96]. As outlined above, these are 
the types of message which machines would be very challenged to deliver. 350 
In summary, evidence indicates that although the environmental values which most 
people display are generally insufficient to motivate necessary environmentalist behaviour 
[97], this could change. A shift away from egoistic individual rights-based norms, towards 
more strongly internalised environmentalist duty-based norms, might well result in 
increased environmentalist behaviour and therefore represent much-needed moral 355 
progress. However, the risks of stagnation or backlash associated with machine morality 
indicate that it may be particularly ill-suited to this task. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that powerful incentives structure the choices of engineers concerning 
which moral values the machines they build should reflect, as a result of which the 360 
machines they build will tend to reflect prevailing moral values. We also argued that 
mechanisms of moral progress are likely to be inhibited by moral machines. The upshot 
of these two arguments is that moral machines present a real risk of calcifying prevailing 
moral values. Moreover, the risk we have identified is not a mere abstract, theoretical 
possibility. On the contrary, as humans face the catastrophic dangers of climate change 365 
and ecological destruction as a result of their ongoing engagement in activities that they 
take to be licensed by prevailing moral norms, the risk of value calcification associated 
with moral machines is clear, acute, and urgent. 
However, we also acknowledge that it is difficult to assess how great this risk is, because 
there are currently few machines making moral decisions, and thus little directly relevant 370 
data. Although there is no clear reason to believe that encoding the status quo could 
assist with moral progress, and reasons to believe moral machines will indeed encode the 
status quo, we also note that there are arguments that moral progress might be assisted 
by moral machines that are progressive [14-18]. Further, we agree that artificial 
intelligence in general might prove crucial in supporting decisions of moral relevance, for 375 
example regarding the environment [98, 99]. However, in line with previous critics of 
machine ethics [100-103], we suggest that automatic systems can be constructed for 
human decision support without computing moral values. 
Our aim has been to identify and articulate a risk that has hitherto gone largely 
unrecognised. For reasons of space and the limits of available evidence, we have not 380 
offered an assessment as to the gravity of the risk either in general or in the present 
moment or proposed solutions to it. However, we believe we have said enough to 
warrant the inclusion of this risk alongside other, more familiar risks associated with AI 
and related technologies in the thinking of those who consider the creation of moral 
machines. 385 
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